In response, the QCA has proposed that the definition of a PIE should initially incorporate all FTSE companies due to their significant and far-reaching impact on various stakeholders. Another key concern is the impact of the reforms on company directors.
These reforms have the potential to significantly increase the burdens and personal liability that directors face to the extent that their directorship will simply not be worth the risk and cost, particularly in the smaller company space. Often, barriers to opportunity hit those with the least opportunity the most, it is therefore likely that groups that are already underrepresented in leadership roles in UK businesses will be more heavily impacted.
Maintaining a competitive advantage over the rest of Europe and ensuring the UK continues to be viewed as an attractive listing venue that encourages innovation and growth, whilst maintaining high standards and investor protection, is crucial. Implementing highly costly and burdensome regulation whose value is ambiguous would act as a serious disincentive to companies considering a listing in London. The QCA is working hard as the voice of small and mid-sized quoted companies. We want to make listing attractive again, promote thriving public markets and a prosperous and growing UK economy as a result.
We believe that the Government wants to do the same and in many instances but not in this one it is taking a welcome lead. And we believe that the interests of small and mid-caps must be considered in order to achieve this. It is promising to see such developments and we will continue to work constructively with Government and the policymakers to encourage them to put the views of our members at the heart of this process.
We trust that future policy developments in relation to the stock market will include the voice and opinions of the small and mid-cap community, who are so crucial to economic growth. Whilst they may not be amongst the largest of companies, they are the majority, and their voice must be heard if we want such growth.
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The full text of this chapter is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. If you belong to such an institution, please login or read more about How to Order. Back to Search Go to Page. Go Pages Front matter unlocked item Foreword. Part I. Conceptualising Proportionality Chapter 1. The Typology of Proportionality. Chapter 2. Chapter 3. Proportionality and the Bindingness of Fundamental Rights. Chapter 4. Chapter 5. The Emotional Component of Proportionality.
Chapter 6. The case could stand for the principle, therefore, that one may not be punished for a status in the absence of some act, or it could stand for the broader principle that it is cruel and unusual to punish someone for conduct that he is unable to control, which would make it a holding of far-reaching importance.
Whether either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clauses will govern the requirement of the recognition of capacity defenses to criminal charges remains to be decided. The Court has gone back and forth in its acceptance of proportionality analysis in non-capital cases. It appeared that such analysis had been closely cabined in Rummel v. The Court reasoned that the unique quality of the death penalty rendered capital cases of limited value, and distinguished Weems on the ground that the length of the sentence was of considerably less concern to the Court than were the brutal prison conditions and the post-release denial of significant rights imposed under the peculiar Philippine penal code.
Thus, in order to avoid improper judicial interference with state penal systems, Eighth Amendment judgments must be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible. But when the challenge to punishment goes to the length rather than the seriousness of the offense, the choice is necessarily subjective. Therefore, the Rummel rule appeared to be that states may punish any behavior properly classified as a felony with any length of imprisonment purely as a matter legislative grace.
In any event, the state could focus on recidivism, not the specific acts. Second, the comparison of punishment imposed for the same offenses in other jurisdictions was found unhelpful, differences and similarities being more subtle than gross, and in any case in a federal system one jurisdiction would always be more severe than the rest.
Third, the comparison of punishment imposed for other offenses in the same state ignored the recidivism aspect. Rummel was distinguished in Solem v. His crime was relatively minor, yet life imprisonment without possibility for parole was the harshest penalty possible in South Dakota, reserved for such other offenses as murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, and arson. In only one other state could he have received so harsh a sentence, and in no other state was it mandated. The Court remained closely divided in holding in Harmelin v.
Michigan that a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual as applied to the crime of possession of more than grams of cocaine. There was an opinion of the Court only on the issue of the mandatory nature of the penalty, the Court rejecting an argument that sentencers in non-capital cases must be allowed to hear mitigating evidence.
The first type comprises challenges to the length of actual sentences imposed as being grossly disproportionate, and such challenges are re-subject The second type comprises challenges to particular sentencing practices as being categorically impermissible, but categorical restrictions had theretofore been limited to imposing the death penalty on those with diminished capacity.
In Graham , Justice Kennedy broke new ground and recognized a categorical restriction on life without parole for nonhomicide offenses by juveniles, citing considerations and applying analysis similar to those used in his juvenile capital punishment opinion in Roper.
Alabama , a case questioning the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment without parole on juveniles convicted of homicide. See also Howard v. Fleming, U.
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